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Over the past few years, a movement has been initiated among forensic science researchers 
and practitioners, in Switzerland and across Western criminal justice systems more gener-
ally, to shift away from categorical assertions of common source (e.g., «this crime scene 
mark and this control print come from the same person») towards new reporting formats 
that consider expert conclusions as decisions (e.g., an «identification» or «exclusion» is a 
decision made by the forensic examiner). As this movement gains momentum, there re-
mains disagreement on how exactly the notion of decision ought to be understood. The call 
for improvement of the understanding of the logical tenets of forensic identification deci-
sions faces the obstacle that many forensic practitioners shy away from formal and quanti-
tative approaches (e.g., decision theory). The purpose of this contribution is to show that 
the logical essentials of forensic identification decisions can be captured and conveyed 
without going into the details of the mathematics of decision theory. We will then present 
and defend the view that forensic identification requires assessments and value judgments 
that go beyond the forensic practitioner’s area of competence and that this fact requires a 
reassessment of the distribution of responsibilities between experts and other participants 
in the legal process. 
 
I. Introduction ....................................................................................................................398 
II. Clarifying the logic of identification decisions without numbers ................................... 401 
1. Decision trees: the anatomy of  forensic identification decisions ............................. 401 
2. Thinking about possible decision outcomes ............................................................. 402 
3. Thinking about how to decide ................................................................................... 403 
4. Assessing the suitability of  identification decisions ................................................ 404 
III. Discussion ...................................................................................................................... 406 
1. Decision competence and decision prerogatives ...................................................... 406 
2. Confronting different reporting formats................................................................... 408 
IV. Conclusions ..................................................................................................................... 410 
 
Citation: Alex Biedermann/Joëlle Vuille, Understanding the logic of forensic 
identification decisions (without numbers), in: sui-generis 2018, S. 397  
 
URL:  sui-generis.ch/83  
 
DOI: https://doi.org/10.21257/sg.83  
 
____________________________ 
* Alex Biedermann (alex.biedermann[at]unil.ch), PhD, Associate professor, University of Lausanne, 
School of Criminal Justice. Joëlle Vuille (joelle.vuille[at]unil.ch), PhD, Senior researcher, Universi-
ty of Lausanne, School of Criminal Justice. This research was supported by the Swiss National Sci-
ence Foundation through Grant No. BSSGI0_155809. The authors would like to thank Simon Cole, 
Richard Friedman, Edward Imwinkelried and David Moran for their helpful comments on an earli-
er draft. Alex Biedermann gratefully acknowledges the support of the University of Michigan Law 
School (Michigan Grotius Research Fellowship). This paper was presented at the 18th Annual 
Meeting of the ENFSI Fingerprint Working Group, September 4th–7th 2018, University of Lau-
sanne. 
 
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International License. 
Alex Biedermann/Joëlle Vuille, Understanding the logic of forensic identification decisions (without numbers) 
sui-generis 2018, S. 398 
I. Introduction 
After comparing a fingermark found on a 
crime scene with reference prints taken 
from a suspect, many forensic examiners, 
in Switzerland, Europe and beyond, will 
offer conclusions such as «Source identi-
fication (i.e., came from the same 
source)» or «Source exclusion (i.e., came 
from different sources)». Such conclu-
sions are common in many forensic dis-
ciplines, including comparative hand-
writing examination, tool and shoe mark 
analysis, etc. But they are most typically 
encountered – and expected by recipi-
ents of expert information – in the area 
of fingerprint comparisons.  
 
A reported conclusion of the kind «the 
crime scene trace and the reference mark 
came from the same source» (i.e., source 
identification) may sound self-
explanatory. The problem is that such a 
statement is indefensible. The mere as-
sertion by a forensic practitioner that a 
mark and a reference print come from 
the same source does not imply or prove 
that the source of the mark has been es-
tablished. The reasons for this are three-
fold: empirical, argumentative and regu-
latory. On an empirical account, forensic 
practitioners usually do not conduct an 
exhaustive comparison against all poten-
tial sources of a recovered fingermark. A 
fingerprint examiner does not compare a 
mark found at a crime scene with the ref-
erence prints from all conceivable donors 
of the mark, to find all of them – except 
one – not to correspond.1 It does not 
mean either that the examiner has ex-
____________________________ 
1  In cases where database searches were conduct-
ed, it is sometimes thought that an exhaustive 
comparison was done. This, however, is not the 
case because databases are limited in size and do 
not necessarily represent the relevant population 
(i.e., potential suspects for the case at hand). 
cluded all potential donors from a certain 
suspect population. Most often, it is not 
even clear what the population of poten-
tial sources is (size, composition, etc.).2 A 
further empirical consideration is that, 
both in real cases and in tests under con-
trolled conditions, examiners have been 
found to provide erroneous conclusions. 
Thus, even if an exhaustive investigation 
of all potential sources is feasible (closed-
set situation), assertions of common 
source are still not warranted, because of 
the potential of error.  
 
On the argumentative side, an examiner's 
assertion that a mark and a reference 
print «came from the same source» is 
merely an item of information that is to 
be distinguished from the proposition 
(or, hypothesis) that the mark and the 
reference print come from the same 
source. Even if it is highly probable that 
an examiner will report that a mark and a 
print «came from the same source» when 
that proposition is actually true, this does 
not imply that the proposition of com-
mon source is necessarily true. Claiming 
the contrary would amount to commit-
ting the so-called inversion fallacy, by 
which a deductive statement is wrongly 
transposed into an inductive statement.3  
 
____________________________ 
2  The only exception to this are so-called «closed-
set situations» in which there is a well-defined 
pool of potential sources that can be investigated 
exhaustively. 
3  A general example for the inversion fallacy is 
holding for equal two statements such as «I have 
a dog, hence I have a furry animal» and «I have a 
furry animal, hence I have a dog»; or, more tech-
nically, conflating the probability of finding the 
evidence if one assumes the truth of the hypothe-
sis, and the probability of the hypothesis being 
true if one observes the evidence; See also  Chris-
tophe Champod/Franco Taroni, Probabilités au 
procès pénal - risques et solutions, Revue Pénale 
Suisse 112(2) 1994, 194-219. 
1  
2  
3  
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On a regulatory account, the profession 
itself cautions against the use of identifi-
cation conclusions.4 Recently, for exam-
ple, directions were issued according to 
which examiners shall «not assert that 
two friction ridge impressions originated 
from the same source to the exclusion of 
all other sources», «not assert that latent 
print examination is infallible or has a 
zero error rate» and «not use assertions 
of reasonable certainty».5 This regulatory 
movement started in the United States 
approximately a decade ago following the 
publication of a report by the National 
Research Council.6 Debates around those 
questions have now also spread to Eu-
rope and, to a limited extent, Switzer-
land. In Switzerland, there are currently 
no written guidelines or standards man-
dating fingerprint examiners to adopt a 
given format when reporting on their 
conclusions.7  
____________________________ 
4  Although not competent to impose rules on Swiss 
practitioners, U.S. forensic regulatory entities 
tend to influence practices in Europe as well. The 
guidelines and regulations adopted by such enti-
ties are also a reflection of practices in Europe 
and Switzerland as European and Swiss experts 
participate in the drafting of such documents. 
5  U.S. Department of Justice, Approved Uniform 
Language for Testimony and Reports for the Fo-
rensic Latent Print Discipline, 24 September 
2018. Despite these cautionary notes, the U.S. 
Department of Justice recommends that scien-
tists use expressions of common source, which 
has recently attracted criticism; see notably Si-
mon A. Cole, A discouraging omen: a critical 
evaluation of the approved uniform language for 
testimony and reports for the forensic latent print 
discipline, Georgia State University Law Review 
34/2018 p. 1103 ss. 
6  National Research Council, Strengthening foren-
sic science in the United States: a path forward, 
Washington D.C. 2009. 
7  Without addressing the question of reporting 
formats, Swiss fingerprint examiners have been 
mandated to undergo specialized training and 
continuing education since the so-called «Dé-
claration de Soleure» adopted in 2007 by the 
heads of the forensic science units of the cantonal 
police forces. This «declaration» mandates every 
From the above considerations, it follows 
that the conclusion «came from the same 
source» (i.e., identification) does not im-
ply or establish that the suspect is indeed 
the source of the crime scene trace. This 
is a problem as it makes conclusions dif-
ficult to understand for the recipients of 
such expert testimony. In an effort to 
remedy those shortcomings, forensic 
practitioners have initiated a shift away 
from categorical assertions and towards 
new reporting formats centring on the 
notion of «decision». According to this 
new perspective, a «[source identifica-
tion] conclusion is an examiner's deci-
sion that the observed friction ridge skin 
features are in sufficient correspond-
ence».8 This suggests that source identi-
fication is achieved whenever the exam-
iner decides so – leaving it unclear when 
exactly (i.e., under which conditions) 
such a decision is warranted, and what it 
really means in the context of the case at 
hand. 
 
In a descriptive sense, the choice of the 
term decision for labelling expert conclu-
sions seems sensible since, indeed, exam-
iners9 need to decide, at some point, 
what conclusion to render in any given 
case. One could argue that this terminol-
ogy has the advantage of making it clear 
                                                                              
operational fingerprint examiner to be certified at 
one of three levels (depending on the difficulty of 
the fingerprint comparisons carried out by that 
person) and to renew their certification at regular 
intervals. While abolishing the so-called 12-point 
standard, this «declaration» does not prescribe 
particular reporting formats for expressing the 
conclusions of fingerprint comparisons. Current-
ly, a majority of Swiss fingerprint examiners re-
port their conclusions in terms of «identifica-
tion», «exclusion» or «inconclusive».  
8  U.S. Department of Justice (fn. 5). 
9  In later parts of this paper, we will discuss the 
question of whether forensic examiners are the 
best-placed people in the legal process to render 
identification conclusions. 
4  5  
6  
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that a judgment on the part of the exam-
iner is required, and that a «match» is 
not the reflection of some incontroverti-
ble ground truth that the examiner has 
merely «discovered». In that perspective, 
calling an identification a «decision» is 
an improvement over earlier formula-
tions in that it makes it explicit that a 
(fallible) human evaluation is the basis 
for the expert conclusion provided to the 
fact-finder.  
 
But the notion of decision can also be 
approached in more formal terms, in par-
ticular through decision theory. In its 
normative perspective, decision theory 
defines optimal decisions to be made by 
an agent with rational aspirations, on the 
basis of that agent’s beliefs about uncer-
tain states of nature, and the agent's as-
sessment of the relative desirability10 of 
the various consequences11 of each possi-
____________________________ 
10  Note that one may also assess how undesirable 
(i.e., adverse) decision consequences are. 
Throughout this text, we consider both desirabil-
ity and undesirability, though we may only use 
one term at a time. While technically the two 
terms are captured with two different but related 
concepts, i.e. utilities and losses, respectively, the 
general level of discussion pursued here does not 
require going into these details. Readers may as-
sociate these considerations with Blackstone’s 
famous 10:1 ratio regarding the undesirability of 
falsely convicting one innocent person compared 
against the «loss» incurred by freeing 10 culpable 
individuals. See William Blackstone, Commen-
taries on the Laws of England, 1769, Vol. 4. Re-
printed by: University of Chicago Press, 1979. 
Note, however, that according to Kaye this ratio 
seems to refer to an error rate (across multiple 
cases) rather than an assessment of relative losses 
for a given case at hand. See David H. Kaye, Clari-
fying the burden of persuasion: what Bayesian 
decision rules do and do not do, The Internation-
al Journal of Evidence & Proof 3/1999, p. 1 ss. 
11  Formally, a decision consequence is defined as 
the combination of a decision and a state of na-
ture. For example, reporting an identification 
conclusion (decision) when the person of interest 
truly is the source of the crime scene mark (state 
ble choice.12 According to Cole, however, 
forensic expert working groups do not 
appear to approach decisions in the rig-
orous sense of decision theory.13 Infor-
mal conversations with practitioners 
suggest that the quantitative nature of 
probabilities and utilities, and their co-
herent treatment according to decision 
theory, are seen as hurdles that cannot be 
overcome in this context. One of the aims 
of this contribution is to show that the 
quantitative and computational aspects 
of classic decision theory are not neces-
sarily required for the logical thinking 
about decision problems, and hence 
should not deter practitioners from con-
sidering formal approaches to guide their 
evaluative reporting. 
 
Besides, as it may be tempting to con-
clude that decision-theoretic principles 
are practically irrelevant and can be dealt 
with dismissively, we will explain why 
this attitude is short-sighted. Specifically, 
we will present and defend the view that 
all forensic conclusions, most notably 
identification decisions, have underlying 
logical tenets that can be explained in 
basic decision-theoretic terms, without 
quantitative assessments, and inde-
                                                                              
of nature) will result in a correct identification 
(decision consequence). 
12  For example, when deciding whether to leave 
their home with an umbrella in the morning, a ra-
tional agent will consider both the probabilities of 
it raining that day, as well as the merit of, for ex-
ample, having an umbrella if it rains, the respec-
tive inconvenience of not taking the umbrella and 
being rained on, or taking the umbrella and hav-
ing to carry it around all day although it does not 
rain. See also, for instance, Franco Taroni/Silvia 
Bozza/Colin Aitken, Decision Analysis in Foren-
sic Science, Journal of Forensic Sciences 
50/2005, p. 894 ss. 
13  Simon A. Cole, Individualization is dead, long live 
individualization! Reforms of reporting practices 
for forensic fingerprint analysis in the United 
States, Law, Probability and Risk 13/2014, 
p. 117 ss. 
7  
8  
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pendently of whether or not reporting 
examiners actively endorse and rely on 
decision-theoretic principles when they 
evaluate the evidence in the case at hand. 
Our paper is structured as follows. Sec-
tion II will clarify the fundamental terms 
that all forensic conclusions comprise. 
We will use standard decision-theoretic 
terms, but unlike previous publications 
in this context, we will avoid formulae 
and decision matrices, favouring verbal 
accounts of qualitative considerations 
and graphical means. Based on these el-
ements, Section III will critically review 
and discuss current reporting conven-
tions, showing that the legitimacy of the 
stance taken by a majority of practition-
ers on the topic of identification conclu-
sions must be seriously questioned due 
to the intricate issues and stakes involved 
in forensic identification practice.  
II. Clarifying the logic of identification 
decisions without numbers  
1. Decision trees: the anatomy of  
forensic identification decisions 
The logic of forensic identification deci-
sions can be represented in graphical 
terms, such as decision trees. Consider 
Figure 1, which shows a decision tree for 
a simplified forensic identification prob-
lem. It is simplified because only two de-
cisions are considered: identifying (d1) or 
not identifying the person of interest (d2) 
as the source of the crime scene mark, 
the latter decision being a generic place-
holder for all conclusions other than 
«identification» (for example, «inconclu-
sive»).14  
____________________________ 
14  It is possible to develop decision trees for more 
than two decisions, but they may become more 
«bushy» (see, e.g., Franco Taroni/Alex Bieder-
Decision trees have two types of nodes. 
The first are decision nodes, taking the 
form of squared boxes. Their emanating 
branches represent the different possible 
decisions in the case at hand. These deci-
sions are mutually exclusive and exhaus-
tive: only one of them can be taken, and 
one of them must be taken. Circles are 
another type of nodes – so-called chance 
nodes – whose emanating branches rep-
resent states of nature of the present, 
past or future. These states of nature are 
mutually exclusive and exhaustive. 
 
When constructing decision trees, one 
usually starts on the left, by defining the 
relevant decision point. In our example, 
the possible decisions are represented by 
the branches «identifying the person of 
interest» (d1), or «not identifying the 
person of interest» (d2) as the source of 
the crime scene mark. Moving on each of 
these two branches to the right leads to 
chance nodes, representing the possible 
states of nature under which the deci-
sions are being made. Indeed, when de-
ciding how to conclude, it is not known 
which state of nature actually holds: i.e., 
it is not known whether the person of in-
terest or an unknown person is the 
source of the crime scene mark. At the far 
right-hand side are decision outcomes, 
defined by combinations of decisions and 
particular states of nature: e.g., identify-
ing the person of interest d1 when in fact 
the person of interest is the source of the 
                                                                              
mann/Silvia Bozza/Paolo Garbolino/Colin Aitken, 
Bayesian networks for Probabilistic Inference and 
Decision Analysis in Forensic Science, 2nd ed. 
Chichester 2014). For the purpose of clarity, only 
two decisions are considered here. For general in-
troductions to decision trees see, for example, 
Howard Raiffa, Decision Analysis, Introductory 
Lectures on Choices under Uncertainty, Reading, 
Massachusetts 1968; Dennis V. Lindley, Making 
Decisions, 2nd ed., London 1985. 
9  
10  
11  
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crime scene mark represents a correct 
identification, whereas a false identifica-
tion occurs when the expert identifies the 
person of interest as the source of the 
crime scene mark when in fact an un-
known person is the source of the mark. 
Similarly, a false non-identification and 
correct non-identification occur from de-
ciding d2 when in reality the person of in-
terest and an unknown person, respec-
tively, is the source of the mark.  
2. Thinking about possible decision 
outcomes 
 
Figure 1 provides a descriptive summary 
of the basic elements of a generic forensic 
identification problem. But there is more 
to decision problems than decisions and 
states of nature. Indeed, when making a 
decision, it is natural to pay attention to 
the relative desirability of various deci-
sion consequences. Clearly, not all deci-
sion consequences are equally desirable: 
accurate conclusions, i.e., correct identi-
fication and non-identification, are pre-
ferred to wrong determinations, i.e., false 
identification and false non-
identification (i.e., a missed identifica-
tion). For the purpose of the current dis-
cussion, it is sufficient to express the rel-
ative desirability of decision outcomes 
qualitatively: we use a checkmark in a 
white box for accurate conclusions, and a 
cross for erroneous conclusions. The 
overall worst conclusion, a false identifi-
cation, is shown with a cross in a box  
 
 
with a black background. Note that this is 
a particular assumption that seems suit-
able for identification decisions at ad-
vanced stages in the criminal process 
(e.g., at trial). Assessments may be dif-
ferent during the investigative phase 
where a false non-identification may de-
prive authorities from a relevant investi-
gative lead. A false identification during 
the investigation may be considered less 
adverse than a false non-identification 
because it is expected other information 
accumulated in the case will help uncover 
12  
Figure 1: Decision tree for a simplified forensic identification problem. The squared node represents a deci-
sion point, with two branches representing the two feasible decisions «identify», d1, and «do not identify» (the 
person of interest), d2. The circled nodes represent states of nature (in terms of the branches emanating to the 
right), i.e. the person of interest and an unknown person is the source of the trace, respectively. 
correct identification
false identification
false non-identification
correct non-identification
d1 (“identify”)
d2 (“do not 
identify”)
Trace comes from person of interest
Unknown person is the source
decisions states of nature outcomes
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the false association.15 Figure 2 provides 
a summary of these considerations. 
3. Thinking about how to decide 
Forensic scientists commonly assert that 
when rendering identification conclu-
sions, they adequately take into account 
the fact that conclusions may be errone-
ous and, hence, represent undesirable 
outcomes. But how exactly can this be 
done? To examine this question, consider 
again Figure 2 and imagine a scientist 
who pursues a prudent approach. In par-
ticular, assume that the scientist takes a 
pessimistic perspective, in the sense that, 
whatever decision is made (i.e., «identi-
fying», or «not identifying»), the focus is 
on undesirable outcomes: a false identifi-
cation or a missed identification. Thus, if 
the scientist's concerns are adverse deci-
sion outcomes, one possible strategy – 
known as the minimax strategy – would 
be to always decide not to identify the 
____________________________ 
15  See also Alex Biedermann/Silvia Bozza/Franco 
Taroni/Paolo Garbolino, A formal approach to 
qualifying and quantifying the «goodness» of fo-
rensic identification decisions, Law, Probability 
and Risk (in press). 
person of interest as the source of the 
mark (d2). This attitude would be mean- 
 
ingful in the sense that, even if the expert 
does not identify the person of interest as 
the source of the mark when this person 
is in fact the source of the mark (missed 
identification), this consequence is less 
adverse than committing a wrong identi-
fication (the adverse consequence associ-
ated with d1).16 Indeed, the latter is the 
overall worst consequence (see Sect. 2.2). 
In Figure 2, the branch corresponding to 
decision d2 («do not identify»), the min-
imax decision, is highlighted in bold, and 
the branch representing decision d1 
(«identify») is double crossed. 
 
However, always avoiding the overall 
worst consequence comes at the price of 
never identifying anyone as the source of 
a crime scene trace. Clearly, this would 
severely limit the interest that members 
of the judiciary may have in the services 
of scientists who adopt this approach. 
____________________________ 
16  Hence the word «minimax» for the decision rule 
that selects the option that minimises the maxi-
mum loss. 
13  
14  
Figure 2: Decision tree previously defined in Figure 1, extended here – on the far right-hand side – with an 
indication of the relative desirability of the various possible decision outcomes. Checkmarks represent de-
sirable outcomes, and crosses indicate less desirable outcomes. The overall worst consequence, a false iden-
tification, is highlighted with a cross in a box with a black background. 
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Conversely, the above discussion also 
makes it clear that any person who 
chooses to make identification conclu-
sions, hence all scientists who adhere to 
the traditional identification practice, 
cannot do so without accepting the pos-
sibility of identifying as the source of the 
trace a person who is in fact not the 
source. This gives rise to the following 
two questions: First, if identification  
 
decisions are necessary to the well-
functioning of the legal process, and thus 
must be made, what bases should be re-
quired before they can be made? Second, 
should such decisions be made by foren-
sic scientists, or by the decision-maker? 
We will address these two questions in 
turn in the next paragraph.  
4. Assessing the suitability of  
identification decisions 
As we have seen, decision-makers who 
identify the person of interest as the 
source of a crime scene mark must take 
into consideration the possibility of mak-
ing a false identification. The natural fol-
low-up question to this is: How small 
should the probability of an erroneous 
determination be in order for the identi-
fication decision d1 to be acceptable? 
And, related to this question, how proba-
ble must a correct identification be at a 
minimum before an identification con-
clusion is acceptable? It is important to 
emphasise at this point that the probabil-
ities for the various decision consequenc-
es – and hence the answers to these 
questions – correspond to the decision-
maker's probabilities for the two possible 
states of nature that condition the conse- 
 
quences.17 Figure 3 summarises the two 
main decision ingredients discussed so 
far: the relative adversity of decision con-
sequences and the probability (as as-
sessed by the decision-maker) of each 
consequence. 
 
This captures many experts’ natural way 
of thinking about forensic identification 
problems: indeed, it is often argued that, 
the more an expert regards a false identi-
fication as an undesirable consequence, 
____________________________ 
17  An analogy to this goes as follows: the probability 
of ending up wet (i.e., adverse consequence) 
when not taking an umbrella when leaving your 
home in the morning (i.e., your decision of not 
taking an umbrella) depends on the probability of 
rain while you are out during the day (i.e., the 
probability of the state of nature «rain during the 
day»). So, your probability of incurring the con-
sequence of interest, getting wet, corresponds to 
your probability of rain. 
15  
16  
Figure 3: Decision tree previously defined in Figure 1, highlighting two essential decision ingredients (for the 
situation in which decision d1, «identify», is made): consideration of  the relative adversity of decision con-
sequences, and  the probability of the relevant states of nature (i.e., whether the person of interest or an 
unknown person is the source of the crime scene mark). The dotted lines of the branches indicate that there is 
uncertainty about which state of nature holds, and hence which decision consequence is obtained. 
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the higher her requirements will be for 
the probability that the trace comes from 
the person of interest before she is will-
ing to identify.18 Stated otherwise, in or-
der to feel ‘comfortable’ with making the 
identification decision, decision-makers 
seek to ensure, as best as possible, that 
the person of interest is indeed the 
source of the crime scene mark, rather 
than an unknown person.  
 
Although straightforward at first sight, 
decision theory supports this argument 
in two distinctive and important ways. 
First, decision theory specifies how as-
sessments of the desirability of decision 
consequences are to be coherently com-
bined with probabilities for unknown 
states of nature. Specifically, decision 
theory says that the losses (or, utilities) 
assessed for all possible consequences of 
a decision are to be weighted by the re-
spective probabilities with which the var-
ious consequences are thought to occur, 
leading to the notion of expected loss (or, 
utility). This result, expected loss (or, 
utility), provides a basis for comparing 
the relative merits of rival decisions. 
This, in turn, may help the decision-
maker choose between various decision 
options.19 Second, such computations al-
so allow one to sort out exact decision 
points: for example, given an assessment 
of the relative desirability of the decision 
consequences, decision theory defines 
the limiting probabilities for the states of 
nature such that one decision becomes 
____________________________ 
18  Alex Biedermann/Silvia Bozza/Franco Taroni, 
Normative decision analysis in forensic science, 
Artificial Intelligence and Law (in press).  
19  A well-known decision criterion in this context is 
the criterion instructing decision-makers to select 
the decision that minimises (maximises) expected 
loss (utility) (e.g., Lindley, fn. 14). 
preferable to a given rival decision.20 
This also allows one to give statements of 
the following kind: «When one's proba-
bility for the person of interest being the 
source of the crime scene mark is x times 
greater than the probability that an un-
known person is the source, the decision 
to identify is warranted only if a false 
identification of the person of interest is 
considered less than x times worse than a 
missed identification».21  
 
Again, the quantitative investigation of 
these results is beyond the scope of this 
contribution; of main interest here are 
the more general, qualitative orders of 
magnitude for the assessment of the key 
factors, as well as the insight that, in or-
der to be coherent, these assessments 
ought to still comply with the underlying 
logical constraints. An example for this is 
the precept mentioned above that one's 
probability for the person of interest be-
ing the source of the crime scene mark 
ought to be higher the more adverse a 
false identification is considered to be 
compared to a missed identification. Also 
of interest is the question of what impli-
cations for forensic reporting practice 
these qualitative understandings have. 
____________________________ 
20  Note that such decision points answer the ques-
tions asked at the beginning of this section. 
21  For different numerical examples in the context 
of forensic identification see, for example, Alex 
Biedermann/Silvia Bozza/Franco Taroni, Analys-
ing and exemplifying forensic conclusion criteria 
in terms of Bayesian decision theory, Science & 
Justice 58/2018, p. 159 ss. ; Alex Biedermann/ 
Silvia Bozza/Franco Taroni, The decisionalization 
of individualization, Forensic Science Inter-
national 266/2016, p. 29 ss; Alex Biedermann/ 
Silvia Bozza/Franco Taroni, Decision theoretic 
properties of forensic identification: underlying 
logic and argumentative implications, Forensic 
Science International 177/2008, p.120 ss. For ac-
counts in legal contexts see, for example, Kaye, 
footnote 10, and Richard D. Friedman, The Ele-
ments of Evidence, 4th ed., St. Paul 2017. 
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We will address these aspects in Sec-
tion III.  
III. Discussion 
1. Decision competence and decision 
prerogatives 
As argued throughout Section II, forensic 
identification involves intricate issues 
that raise the question of whether it is 
appropriate for forensic examiners to 
render identification decisions. Specifi-
cally, the question is whether forensic ex-
aminers should take a stance with re-
spect to (i) the probabilities as to whether 
the person of interest or an unknown 
person is the source of the crime scene 
mark, and (ii) the relative desirability of 
the various decision consequences. 
 
Let us consider aspect (i) first: What does 
the forensic scientist really know when it 
comes to judging whether the person of 
interest is the source of the crime scene 
mark? The answer is «most often, not 
much», essentially because the forensic 
scientist does not have access to the en-
tirety of the case brought against the de-
fendant. Besides, there is a misconcep-
tion about the scientist's role – aspect 
(ii). A blunt way to state it is as follows: 
Why would scientists think they have any 
competence in assessing how adverse it 
would be for this defendant to be wrong-
ly associated with the crime scene mark, 
i.e. suffering the consequences of an er-
roneous determination made by the ex-
aminer? Conversely, why would scien-
tists think they have the competence to 
assess how adverse it would be for socie-
ty in this particular case to miss a correct 
identification? More generally, the ques-
tion we face is: Do we want examiners to 
make assessments as to the relative ad-
versity of their erroneous determina-
tions, in particular false identifications, 
decisions from which they do not suffer 
themselves the most if they make a mis-
take?22 Clearly, these are fundamental 
questions that cannot be answered from 
the scientists’ perspective alone. These 
questions touch upon the broader topics 
of decision competence and decision pre-
rogatives, tightly connected to the rights 
and duties of the parties at trial, and the 
broader values at stake in the criminal 
justice process. 
 
It is true that none of the essential deci-
sion ingredients exposed in Section II.3 
are original. Indeed, it is a well-known 
precept that one ought to be concerned 
about the relative adversity of decision 
consequences and the probability of their 
occurrence. And yet, although the fun-
damental decision ingredients are well 
known, examiners do not cope with them 
explicitly. It is a well-established princi-
ple that experts should not explicitly 
opine as to questions of law. There is no 
reason why they should be allowed to do 
so implicitly either. The fact-finder and 
the parties do not receive answers from 
experts to questions such as how adverse 
a false identification should be judged, 
and what the threshold probability nec-
essary to identify should be in any indi-
vidual case. No scientist can answer these 
questions, yet scientists identify every 
day (i.e., render identification decisions). 
 
____________________________ 
22  We acknowledge at this point that our discussion 
is entirely focused on the person of interest. The 
relative adversity of erroneous determinations 
may also be looked at from the viewpoint of ex-
aminers, their organisational units etc. (e.g., im-
pact on reputation, financial loss due to compen-
sation allocated to wrongly identified person). 
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It can be useful to look at the intricacy of 
identification decisions from the view-
point of more general, overarching legal 
concepts, such as deference.23 This con-
cept provides a good descriptive account 
of widespread current identification 
practice. Indeed, whenever recipients of 
expert information invite scientists to di-
rectly answer questions such as «is the 
person of interest the source of the crime 
scene mark?», they defer conclusions of 
common source to scientists. 
 
Pairing the deferential account of expert 
witness testimony in the context of fo-
rensic identification with the insight pro-
vided by the decisional account outlined 
throughout Section II further clarifies 
what exactly happens in current report-
ing practice: not only is the identification 
decision deferred to the scientist, but so 
are crucial decision ingredients (i.e., val-
ue judgments and probabilities). Scien-
tists may be aware of this decisional bur-
den and at least tacitly assess the inevita-
ble decision ingredients. But since this 
does not currently take place transpar-
ently, and the court is not told about the 
assumptions being made by scientists, 
they will impose their assessments onto 
the court. Worse than this lack of trans-
parency are those situations in which the 
scientist is not aware of what it really 
means to identify, and the court is left 
uninformed about the logical underpin-
nings of identification decisions. In the 
latter case, the process will operate with-
out safeguards against flawed modes of 
reasoning, as for both the expert and the 
recipients of expert information it re-
____________________________ 
23  Ronald J. Allen/Joe S. Miller, The common law 
theory of experts: deference or education? 
Northwestern University Law Review 87/1993, 
p. 1131 ss. 
mains unclear what exactly is logically 
and conceptually at stake with identifica-
tion conclusions. 
 
What emerges from this cross-
perspective between the deferential ac-
count of forensic evidence and forensic 
decisionalism, is not a solution, but an 
original way to look at the problem of 
identification. Apart from providing ar-
guments against deference, the decision-
al account can help fact-finders and par-
ties better understand that forensic iden-
tification requires assessments that inti-
mately relate to the personal situation of 
the defendant and, thus, that it may be in 
the interest of the fact-finders and parties 
to take a close look at how those assess-
ments are actually made. The decisional 
account thus helps to empower the fact-
finders and the parties, by encouraging 
them to adopt a more active role in the 
legal process when experts are called to 
testify. Defence lawyers, especially, may 
wish to keep control over the assessment 
of factors relevant to their clients’ situa-
tion.  
 
Our analysis thus far does not answer the 
question of who should conclude or de-
cide on the identification (or otherwise) 
of the person of interest, but it shows 
that identification goes beyond purely 
scientific considerations. These wider 
considerations depend on the internal 
structure and policy choices of the re-
spective legal order.24 
____________________________ 
24  Alex Biedermann/Kyriakos N. Kotsoglou, 
Decisional dimensions in expert witness 
testimony – A structural analysis, (in press): 
David R. Mandel et al. (Eds.)., Frontiers in 
Psychology; Judgment and Decision Making 
Under Uncertainty: Descriptive, Normative, and 
Prescriptive Perspectives. 
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2. Confronting different reporting 
formats  
The attentive reader will have noticed 
that, throughout the analyses and discus-
sion presented so far in this paper, the 
focus was on questions regarding facts:  
 
 Who is the source of the crime  
scene mark? 
 
Let us call this the traditional identifica-
tion paradigm. It differs from questions 
of the following kind, called here the 
evaluative account of forensic report-
ing25: 
 
 What is the (probative) value of the 
similarities and differences ob-
served between the crime scene 
mark and the reference material 
taken from the person of interest?  
 
 and  
 
 For which (if any) of the two com-
peting propositions do the observa-
tions provide support? – Do the ob-
servations support the proposition 
that the person of interest is the 
source of the crime scene mark, or 
the proposition that an unknown 
person is the source of the mark?  
 
Let us illustrate the above two perspec-
tives in further detail. Consider a com-
parison between a fingermark found on a 
crime scene and a reference fingerprint 
taken from a suspect. After analyzing the 
mark and comparing it to the print, the 
analyst will give consideration to the en-
tirety of the observations, i.e. both simi-
____________________________ 
25  European Network of Forensic Science Institute, 
Guideline for Evaluative Reporting in Forensic 
Science. Strengthening the Evaluation of Forensic 
Results across Europe (STEOFRAE), 2015. 
larities and discrepancies. Analysts who 
adhere to the evaluative account will fo-
cus their attention on the assignment of a 
probability for observing the similarities 
and discrepancies under the assumption 
that the person of interest is the source of 
the crime scene mark. Similarly, they will 
also assess the probability of making the 
observations given the assumption that 
someone else than the person of interest 
is the source of the crime scene mark. 
Such evaluations are based on the ex-
pert’s knowledge, ideally informed by 
structured data published in the scien-
tific literature. Personal experience in the 
form of comparisons performed on spec-
imens known to come from the same and 
different sources, respectively, may also 
be invoked provided that the relevant 
work experience has been documented 
and can be disclosed for review and in-
spection.26 The result of these considera-
tions is a ratio of probabilities, commonly 
known as a likelihood ratio. In essence, 
the likelihood ratio multiplies by V 
(where V is the value of the likelihood ra-
tio) the prior odds in favor of the propo-
sition that the person of interest is the 
source of the crime mark, rather than an 
unknown person. These are the odds 
held by the decision-maker on the basis 
of the elements in the case before the sci-
entific evidence is heard. It is clear at this 
inferential stage that the discussion fo-
cuses only on how the scientific findings 
inform the decision-maker's probability 
for the proposition that the person of in-
terest, rather than an unknown person, is 
the source of the crime scene mark. As 
seen on the far right-hand side in Fig-
ure 3, this represents only one of the es-
sential decision ingredients. Other ele-
ments are needed in order to decide 
____________________________ 
26  See ENFSI (fn. 25). 
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whether – or declare that – the person of 
interest or an unknown person is the 
source of the crime scene mark.  
 
As we have seen, the decision-maker will 
also need to take into account how ad-
verse it is to wrongly associate the person 
of interest with the crime scene mark, 
compared to wrongly excluding the per-
son of interest as the source of the crime 
scene mark. Contrary to the evaluation 
aspects of the task, for which the scientist 
can indeed be of help to the decision-
maker, these latter elements of decision 
are of a very different nature, and relate 
to the values attached to the consequenc-
es of the decision made in that particular 
criminal case. The main insight here is 
that while inference and decision are not 
the same, they are connected: inference 
is a necessary preliminary for decision. 
In the context of a criminal case, this 
means that the scientist can – at best – 
help with inference, but cannot be in 
charge of the complete inference pro-
cess,27 and even less so of the subsequent 
decision stage.28  
____________________________ 
27  Richard D. Friedman, Controlling the jury-
teaching function, Seton Hall Law Review 
48/2018, p. 815 ss. 
28  Specifically, in a likelihood ratio approach, the 
scientist would convey that it is impossible to tell 
– from a scientific point of view – what the prob-
ability is that the defendant is the source of the 
crime scene mark. For example, in case of a like-
lihood ratio greater than one, the scientist may 
give a statement along the following lines: «I 
cannot tell you what the probability is that the de-
fendant left the fingermark because I do not have 
a suitable prior probability for that proposition 
(i.e., before considering the results of my analy-
sis). This prior probability depends on the 
strength of the other evidence for and against the 
defendant, which is an assessment that lies be-
yond my area of competence. All I can tell you is 
that, whatever your probability is that the de-
fendant rather than an unknown person is the 
source of the crime mark, based on my analysis, 
Let us consider now the case of an expert 
who works in the identification para-
digm. Such an expert will also assess the 
probative weight of the observed similar-
ities and differences between the crime 
scene mark and the reference print pro-
vided by the suspect, though this expert 
will use a somewhat different terminolo-
gy. For example, if the expert uses the 
U.S. Department of Justice approved 
uniform language, her conclusions will 
be a direct statement of the probability 
that the person of interest, rather than an 
unknown person, is the source of the 
crime scene mark. Specifically, the expert 
will assert that «[a] source identification 
is a statement of an examiner's belief (...) 
that the probability that the two impres-
sions were made by different sources is 
so small that it is negligible».29 The ex-
aminer thus considers it as certain that 
the person of interest is the source of the 
crime scene mark, and has identified the 
person as the source of the mark.30 We 
see two main problems with such an as-
sertion.  
 
First, it makes no sense to call a probabil-
ity «negligible» in and of itself, without 
acknowledging clearly what is at stake. 
Consider, for example, the probability of 
eating a food to which you are allergic 
when you order a dish in a restaurant. 
When ordering, you ask the waiter 
whether the dish contains the ingredient 
to which you are allergic. The waiter re-
plies that there could be trace amounts of 
the food in the dish, but that the proba-
                                                                              
this probability is higher than it was before I did 
my analysis.» 
29  U.S. Department of Justice (fn. 5). 
30  William C. Thompson/Joëlle Vuille/Franco 
Taroni/Alex Biedermann, After uniqueness: the 
evolution of forensic science opinions, Judicature 
102/2018, p. 18 ss.  
29  
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bility is negligible. But isn’t this some-
thing you should assess, considering the 
consequences of eating the food in your 
particular case? If your allergy tends to 
give you tickles in the back of the throat 
(irritating but not serious), what you 
consider to be a negligible probability of 
encountering the target ingredient in 
your plate will be very different from a 
situation in which eating the food in 
question could cause you an anaphylactic 
shock (and potentially kill you). At an ex-
treme, imagine a case in which false 
identifications are considered unac-
ceptable decision consequences on prin-
ciple – and hence are to be avoided at all 
costs. In such a case, no positive proba-
bility for an unknown person being the 
source of the crime stain is «negligible» 
(i.e., acceptable). Hence, the use of the 
adjective «negligible» shows that experts 
indeed, at least tacitly, make judgments 
as to the values at play with the conse-
quences of their decisions. This, however, 
poses a problem in terms of transparen-
cy, because experts will make value 
judgments for which they have not been 
mandated, and for which they have no 
competence whatsoever.  
 
The second problem is that the reporting 
format «source identification» is very 
challenging to comprehend because the 
exact contribution of the scientific find-
ings (observed similarities and differ-
ences) to the process of inference re-
mains opaque. The two stages, inference 
and decision, are combined in a way that 
makes it impossible for the decision-
maker to sort out what derives from sci-
ence and can legitimately be expected 
from the scientist, and what embodies 
broader considerations for which the sci-
entist holds no competence to give an 
opinion. 
 
As is apparent, experts operating in the 
identification paradigm appropriate as-
sessments that, following our discussion 
in Section III.1, fall outside of their field 
of expertise. Notably, experts do not have 
exhaustive information regarding the 
case. Thus, they are logically and practi-
cally unable to combine their findings 
with the other elements in the case; 
hence, there is no basis for them to de-
termine whether the suspect is indeed 
the source of the crime scene mark. Be-
sides, it is not their role to engage in de-
cisional considerations that are of a legal 
nature (e.g., contemplating the question 
of how much doubt is allowed regarding 
the proposition of common source), or 
constitute policy matters (e.g., the ques-
tion of how adverse a false identification 
is). In sum, an expert who identifies the 
source of a crime scene mark appropri-
ates rights and competences that belong 
to the fact-finder. As noted by Stoney, 
doing so renders forensic science practice 
unscientific.31   
IV. Conclusions 
In this contribution, we have made an 
attempt to capture, descriptively and 
analytically, forensic identification in its 
most fundamental and, hopefully, least 
____________________________ 
31  David A. Stoney, Discussion on the paper by 
Neumann, Evett and Skerrett, Journal of the 
Royal Statistical Society: Series A (Statistics in 
Society) 175/2012, p. 399 s. Some writers have 
gone so far as to recommend that «(...) experts 
should abandon the identifica-
tion/individualization conclusion altogether» 
Christophe Champod/Chris Lennard/Pierre 
Margot/Milutin Stoilovic, Fingerprints and other 
Ridge Skin Impressions, 2nd ed., Boca Raton 2016 
(at 96).  
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controversial terms. This has led us, in 
essence, to see that any person in charge 
of forensic identification faces the follow-
ing situation: 
 
 The decision to render an identifi-
cation conclusion inevitably entails 
one of several possible consequenc-
es; i.e., there is uncertainty about 
decision consequences. For exam-
ple, deciding to identify is accom-
panied with the possibility of 
wrongly associating the person of 
interest with the crime mark. The 
probability of this consequence de-
pends on how sure the decision-
maker is, at the time of making the 
identification decision, that the per-
son of interest is indeed the source 
of the crime scene mark. 
 
One may say that this is not an original 
insight, but merely common-sense un-
derstanding. While we agree with this 
observation, we have used this intuitively 
tractable account only as a starting point 
to argue that formal analytical ap-
proaches to decision analysis, in particu-
lar decision theory, are accessible con-
cepts for all discussants involved in fo-
rensic identification, and that full math-
ematical developments are not needed in 
order to convey general decisional as-
pects of forensic identification problems. 
 
There are several key-points to be re-
tained from our analysis. On the one 
hand, all main elements of decision theo-
ry can be found in forensic identification 
problems, in particular: decisions (e.g., 
the decision to render a particular con-
clusion, such as «source identification»), 
states of nature32 (i.e., whether the per-
son of interest or an unknown person is 
the source of the crime scene mark), de-
cision consequences (e.g., a correct iden-
tification, a false identification, etc.) and 
expressions of (un-)desirability of deci-
sion consequences. But decision theory 
provides much more: it also provides as-
sistance in the coherent combination of 
the various decision ingredients, and – 
most prominently – in how to compare 
rival decisions. As we have seen, this 
comparison involves the consideration of 
the various possible consequences of a 
decision, their relative (un-)desirability, 
and the probability with which those 
consequences may be incurred.  
 
Taken together, these insights uncover 
what is fundamentally at stake with tra-
ditional identification decisions, but has 
hitherto been left unaddressed in broader 
circles of the field. Stoney concisely not-
ed: 
 
 «For over 100 years the courts and 
the public have expected, and fin-
gerprint examiners have provided, 
expert testimony that fuses these 
three elements: offering testimony 
not as evidence, but as proof, as-
suming priors and including deci-
sion making preferences. This cre-
ated an overwhelming and unrealis-
tic burden, asking fingerprint exam-
iners, in the name of science, for 
something that science cannot pro-
vide. As a necessary consequence, 
fingerprint examiners became un-
scientific.»33 
 
____________________________ 
32  Associated to states of nature are probabilities, 
expressing one's uncertainty regarding which 
state of nature actually holds. 
33  Stoney (fn. 31), p. 400.  
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Stoney thus acknowledges that identifi-
cation amounts to a decision that in-
volves value judgments, but advises that 
this goes beyond the scientist's area of 
competence – anticipating thus the con-
clusions of our discussion (Section III).  
 
It is useful to clarify what exactly the 
formal decisional perspective to forensic 
identification can do for us, and what it 
cannot do. A convenient way to clarify 
some of the main considerations is a hy-
pothetical conversation in question and 
answer format, such as follows:  
 
 Q: «In a nutshell, what exactly does 
decision theory say?» 
 
 A: «In essence, decision theory fo-
cuses on the problem of how to sen-
sibly determine the course of action 
to be taken when the person in 
charge of the decision may ‹gain› or 
‹lose› through decision conse-
quences because the hypotheses 
about the present, past or future 
state of the world are unknown to 
us to varying degrees.» 
 
 Q: «Can you be more precise, based 
on what elements do or should we 
decide?»  
 
 A: «A short answer to this is: when 
using decision theory to analyse 
your decision problem, you consid-
er (1) what you think is probably the 
case (i.e., how convinced you are 
that the person of interest is the 
source of the crime scene mark), 
and (2) what you (don’t) want in 
terms of values (i.e., how you value 
the various possible decision conse-
quences and compare them against 
each other).» 
 
 Q: «Okay, but I already keep these 
things in mind, is there anything 
more that decision theory can do 
for me?» 
 
 A: «Here is what decision theory 
provides as added values: First, de-
cision theory tells you that you do 
indeed focus on the pertinent as-
pects. Second, decision theory pro-
vides you with instructions on how 
to handle, in a logically sound way, 
both probability and preferences for 
decision consequences.« 
 
 Q: «Okay, but what exactly are 
those instructions and how do I ap-
ply them?» 
 
 A: «There is a mathematical dimen-
sion to decision theory that defines 
precisely how probabilities and val-
ue judgments ought to be com-
bined, and rival decisions be com-
pared.34 On a more general (i.e., 
non-numerical) account, and ap-
plied to the context of forensic iden-
tification, decision-theoretic advice 
can also be given in verbal terms, 
such as ‹the more is at stake, the 
more you shall be sure before you 
decide›.» 
 
 Q: «This still does not tell me how 
exactly I should assess the ‹stakes›, 
how sure I should be and, finally, 
who ought to decide.» 
 
 A: «You are exactly right: decision 
theory makes no prescription what-
soever about how and by whom it is 
to be applied. It is a general theory. 
It provides decision-makers, who-
____________________________ 
34  As noted earlier in Sect. II.4, the mathematics of 
decision analysis are beyond the scope of this pa-
per. 
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ever they may be, with a framework 
to help them better analyse and 
compare the advantages and possi-
ble drawbacks of each decision.» 
 
 Q: «So, we cannot use decision the-
ory directly in forensic identifica-
tion, and thus it is of limited practi-
cal relevance.» 
 
 A: «There is no suggestion of reduc-
ing forensic identification to a pure-
ly decision-theoretic discourse, or 
even delegating forensic identifica-
tion to an abstract theory. Instead, 
decision theory supports decision-
makers in thinking in clear and 
structured ways about their deci-
sion problem in the individual case 
and before they decide. Beyond the 
application in individual cases, de-
cision theory helps us clarify the 
fundamental issues at play with fo-
rensic identification, allowing all 
participants in the legal process to 
gain a better awareness of the key 
factors and assessments. This is a 
contribution towards more trans-
parency.» 
 
The latter paragraph brings the pending 
key challenges for forensic practitioners 
and recipients of expert information to 
the point. Forensic identifications are de-
cisions that, in the end, still need to be 
made by persons. Formal theories cannot 
relieve us from this burden. It is up to the 
forensic and legal communities to use in-
sight from formal analyses wisely, espe-
cially for allocating decisional duties and 
defining respective areas of competence 
of both forensic experts and legal practi-
tioners in a better-informed and more 
transparent way. In this sense, we are of 
the opinion that forensic examiners 
should limit themselves to opining on the 
probative value of the evidence, and re-
frain from opining on the probability of 
the hypotheses at play in a given criminal 
case, as such opinions always entail as-
sumptions that lay in the competence of 
the fact-finder.  
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